, and it never went above 3.3 percent in a single year. Real GDP over the same period grew at an average rate of 2.9 percent per year, and the unemployment rate averaged 4.7 percent. While there were two recessions during this decade, that in 1954 was exceedingly mild, and that in 1958 was sharp but very brief. Although this unquestionably good economic performance is not proof that monetary policy was similarly good in the 1950's, it is certainly suggestive. At the very least, it implies that those who would criticize monetary policy in this decade are left with a mystery: Why was performance so good if monetary policy was poor or inept?
This paper suggests an alternative view of monetary policy in the 1950's, and hence a possible solution to the mystery of that decade's outstanding economic performance. We show that policy in the 1950's was actually quite sophisticated. Narrative evidence on the motivation of policymakers and their understanding of the economy shows that the Federal Reserve of the 1950's was remarkably similar to the Federal Reserve of the 1990's. In particular, the Federal Reserve in the early postwar era showed the same overarching concern about in ation that is the hallmark of post-Paul Volcker monetary-policy orthodoxy. We also nd that the Federal Reserve of the 1950's was not wedded to faulty indicators in its implementation of policy. Finally, empirical analysis of the behavior of the federal funds rate shows that policymakers in the 1950's responded much more aggressively to expected in ation than did policymakers in the 1960's and 1970's.
I. Narrative Evidence
Given that the time period is short, it is hard to test statistically whether the Federal Reserve of the 1950's was blessed with good sense or good luck. 
A. An Overarching Concern about In ation
The most obvious and signi cant belief revealed by the Minutes is a fundamental abhorrence of in ation by virtually all members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). Indeed, in reading the Minutes, one periodically has to double-check the data. The discussion was often so fervent and the predictions so dire that it is hard to believe that in ation was actually very low.
The overarching concern about in ation is revealed most clearly in the statements the members made and the actions they endorsed during the times when in ation began to accelerate, if only modestly, in the mid and late 1950's. For example, in mid-1955 the economy was quite well recovered from the recession of [1953] [1954] , and there were fears that prices were about to rise. Many members of the FOMC spoke about the need to act decisively to prevent in ation. In August, Chairman Martin said in one of his rare prepared statements to the FOMC: "In ation is a thief in the night and if we don't act promptly and decisively we will always be behind" (Minutes, 2 August 1955, p. 13). In November, Governor J. L. Robertson said, "I feel that there are in ationary pressures present which should be checked now by a rmer monetary policy-one rm enough to curtail spending and thus dampen price pressures" (Minutes, 16 November 1955, p. 20 ; emphasis in the original). In response to these concerns, the discount rate was raised by a full percentage point between April and November, and other contractionary measures were taken.
The dislike of in ation and the desire to ght it were even more obvious in 1958. Almost as soon as the trough of the 1957-1958 recession was reached in the spring of 1958, the FOMC began to worry about in ation. The members felt that they had not reacted soon enough in 1955, and they were willing to risk another slowdown and Congressional anger to keep ination from rising again. Chairman Martin said "he did not think that the System had faced in recent years anything like the present problem, whether it be called an in ationary psychosis or in ationary psychology. He did not know how to deal with the speci cs of the problem except by moving in the right direction within the System" (Minutes, 19 August 1958, p. 59) . In doing so, however, the System would have "to have courage to assume the risks that were involved" (p. 58). By September, interest rates had risen back to their 1957 peak level, and Vice Chairman Alfred Hayes expressed concern that further action "could lead to interest-rate levels so high as to be harmful to the economy and so high as to place the System in political jeopardy" (Minutes, 9 September 1958, p. 12) . His concern, however, was not shared by most other members. Chairman Martin responded that "If the System should lose its independence in the process of ghting for sound money, that would indeed be a great feather in its cap and ultimately its success would be great" (p. 53). Governor James Vardaman also expressed the view that ghting in ation was of paramount importance. He said, "the country was going to have in ation and ... there must be serious shock treatment" (p. 27).
The concern over in ation and the desire for tight policy continued for most of 1959. In February, H. G. Leedy summarized his view of the role of monetary policy: "The System, of course, wanted growth as well as stability, but if temporarily there had to be a choice between growth and arresting in ationary psychology he would favor the latter course" (Minutes, 10 February 1959, p. 22) . In late May, Vice Chairman Hayes announced that "In the light of these threats to our economy, I am convinced that the time has come for a decisive signal of the Federal Reserve System's determination to do its part to check in ationary trends" (Minutes, 26 May 1959, p. 17) .
B. Model of the Economy
The narrative record also provides crucial evidence about why monetary policymakers in the 1950's disliked in ation so. Their model of how the macroeconomy operated contained both a remarkably modern view of the causes of in ation and a rm belief that the output costs of in ation were large and imminent. As a result, they rmly believed that in ghting ination they were encouraging both short-run stability and long-run growth.
A key feature of the model of many FOMC members was a sensible view of capacity or full employment. Most policymakers believed that in ation began to rise when there was still signi cant unemployment. For example, in July 1955, when unemployment was 4.0 percent, Vice Chairman Allan Sproul said that the economy was "nearer than we have been since early 1953 to full utilization of plant, equipment, and manpower; prices which have been stable, in the aggregate, for two years may be about to get a push on the up-side due to pressure from costs and from anticipation of price rises by businessmen, purchasing agents, and consumers" (Minutes, 12 July 1955, pp. 26 -27) . At the next meeting, Malcolm Bryan said that "the apparent present trends in the economy simply extend themselves to over-reach comfortable capacity and that, accordingly, an in ation is inevitable" (Minutes, 2 August 1955, p. 23). Watrous Irons subscribed to the same view a few months later, saying, "The economy was moving nearer capacity in many respects, and as this point approached less ef cient means of production would be utilized and prices would tend to rise" (Minutes, 4 October 1955, p. 8) . Again in 1959 when unemployment was 5.0 percent, Woodlief Thomas, the chief economist, said, "The economy is approaching the limits of resource utilization" (Minutes, 16 June 1959, p. 6) .
The members of the FOMC and the Board staff were certainly aware that there was a short-run trade-off between in ation and output. However, they were united in believing adamantly that there was not a positive long-run trade-off. Indeed, by far the most common view was that if excessive demand resulted in in ation, output would actually fall in the long run. This view is similar to those of many current monetary policymakers, such as Alan Greenspan (see e.g., Greenspan, 1997) .
This was clearly Chairman Martin's view. Martin said in 1958: "If in ation should begin to develop again, it might be that the number of unemployed would be temporarily reduced to four million [from the current level of ve million], or some gure in that range, but there would be a larger amount of unemployment for a long time to come. If in ation should really get a head of steam up, unemployment might rise to ten million or fteen million" (Minutes, 19 August 1958, p. 57) . Martin repeated this view in Congressional testimony in 1959, saying: "If total demands tend to run ahead of the output potential, the general price level will begin to rise and this, in turn, will have an adverse impact both on growth of demands and on means of nancing increased and improved capacity. It will also have adverse effects on the ef ciency with which resources are utilized" (Martin, 1959a p. 118) .
Two features of this framework are noteworthy. The rst is that the level of in ation at which Martin and others felt negative consequences were likely was very low. No one was contemplating in ation of more than 5 percent when making the dire predictions of long-run consequences. Second, the negative effects of in ation were thought to occur quite quickly. Indeed, in ation could actually cause a recession. Martin expressed this view very clearly in Congressional testimony in 1959. He stated, "I happen to believe, Mr. Patman, that the 1957-58 recession was a direct result of letting in ation get substantially ahead of us" (Martin, 1959b (Martin, p. 1285 . Thomas, the chief economist, expressed a similar view. In September 1959, he said, "Increasing demands after mid-1955 resulted in relatively small increases in output but marked advances in prices ... . Distortions such as undue inventory accumulation, too hasty capital expansion in some areas, too rapid a rise in debt burden, and consumer resistance to price increases undermined the prevailing high activity and led to the recession of 1957-58" (Minutes, 22 September 1959, p. 8) .
The belief in the absence of a long-run (positive) trade-off is certainly much more modern than the simplistic Keynesian model that held sway in the 1960's and 1970's. Indeed, many of the statements made by FOMC members in the 1950's could be inserted into the narrative record for the 1980's and 1990's without notice. That the Federal Reserve had this model in the 1950's suggests that the passionate statements about the dangers of in ation were not mere window dressing. Rather, they were part of a coherent view that placed predominant emphasis on keeping in ation in check.
C. Implementation of Policy
Brunner and Meltzer (1964), Calomiris and Wheelock (1998) , and others argue that an important source of policy mistakes in the 1950's and 1960's was a focus on free reserves (total reserves less required reserves less borrowed reserves). And, there is no doubt that free reserves played an important role in policy in the 1950's. For example, most FOMC meetings ended with some discussion of a target for free reserves.
However, we nd no evidence that this focus on free reserves was predominant or led to persistent mistakes. The narrative record shows that the FOMC also paid close attention to interest rates, and goals for key interest rates were often used as a supplement to instructions about free reserves. A very common instruction was that the Account Manager should pay close attention to the "color, feel, and tone of the market" (Minutes, 30 September 1958, p. 46) . To a large degree, this instruction meant that he was to watch short-term interest rates. Often the role of interest rates was more explicit. For example, when Vice Chairman Sproul gave a detailed summary of what various terms such as "active ease" or "restraint" meant, the behavior of interest rates was central (Minutes, 11 January 1955, pp. 10 -12) . Indeed, the FOMC often chose the target for free reserves to try to attain a particular interest-rate outcome. In January 1955, for example, Martin asked the Account Manager what "operations ... might be followed for the System account to provide a minimum disturbance to the market during the immediate future [that is, to keep interest rates steady]" (Minutes, 25 January 1955, p. 9). The Account Manager responded by suggesting a range for free reserves, and the FOMC adopted a target within that range. And when the Committee expected a shift in the relationship between free reserves and interest rates, it typically changed the reserves target. In March 1955, for example, the FOMC expected that without open-market operations, there would be a large fall in free reserves with only slight upward pressure on rates. Since the Committee felt that some rise in rates was desirable, it decided to allow the large decline (Minutes, 29 March 1955, pp. 5-9 ).
An examination of the data on free reserves and interest rates con rms the key role of interest rates in policy-making. For most periods, free reserves and the federal funds rate move together closely, but in opposite directions. The main exception occurs in 1956, when both series rise considerably. Throughout the year the Federal Reserve expressed an intent to increase the degree of restraint. The "Record of Policy Actions" for the 27 March meeting states that the Committee felt that "the System would be derelict in its duty if it did not exercise additional restraint." On 17 April, the Committee "agreed that there should be no relaxation of pressures"; at the 7 August meeting, it moved "to strengthen credit restraint"; and on 21 August, "The Committee felt that credit policy should be made somewhat more restrictive" (Board of Governors, 1956 pp. 26, 28, 36, 37) . The rise in free reserves, therefore, was evidently an accommodative move taken to achieve a desired behavior of interest rates in the face of shifts in the normal behavior of reserves.
These considerations suggest that while targets for free reserves were important in the short-run implementation of policy, nominal interest rates were predominant over longer horizons. And since in ation varied little in the 1950's, nominal interest rates provided a good indication of tightness in credit markets. Furthermore, many FOMC members showed a clear understanding of the distinction between real and nominal interest rates. For example, in 1959, Karl Bopp said, "One reason for the present level of interest rates is the anticipation of further in ation" (Minutes, 13 October 1959, p. 15) .
The FOMC was also acutely aware of the lags associated with monetary policy. The members often worried that in ation, while currently low, was about to take off. For example, in September 1958, Leedy said that "the System should not postpone the matter of looking at the possibility of in ation ahead of it. There were signs of recovery on every hand, and if the System should wait until there was recovery beyond any shadow of a doubt it seemed to him that the System would have lost its opportunity to do the kind of a job that it was supposed to be doing" (Minutes, 9 September 1958, p. 32) . Similarly, in September 1959, Governor Robertson "expressed the view that the System ought to adopt an af rmative position of restrictiveness in order to keep on top of the potential in ationary situation ahead. Otherwise, the System would get behind the game and might never catch up-repeating the mistakes of a few years ago" (Minutes, 1 September 1959, p. 21) .
II. Statistical Evidence
To see if policymakers backed up their words with actions, one needs to supplement the narrative analysis with statistical evidence. To this end, we look at how the federal funds rate responded to developments in the macroeconomy in the 1950's and compare those responses with the responses in other periods.
viewed as a suggestive check on the narrative analysis rather than as a conclusive test.
A. Speci cation
The particular speci cation that we consider is a forward-looking Taylor rule (see e.g., Richard Clarida et al., 2000) . In its simplest, descriptive form, a Taylor rule shows how the Federal Reserve chooses the federal funds rate in response to in ation and departures of output from trend. A forward-looking Taylor rule takes into account the fact that the monetary authority typically responds to expectations of these variables. As discussed above, this forward-looking behavior was an important feature of policymaking in the 1950's.
The forward-looking Taylor rule that we consider is simply
where i is the federal funds rate, p is in ation, and Y 2 Y # is the deviation of output from trend. Time is measured in quarters. To implement this speci cation, we regress the federal funds rate on the leads of actual in ation and the deviation of output from trend, instrumenting with information known at time t. For instruments, we use (in addition to the constant) the contemporaneous and two lagged values of ination and the contemporaneous deviation of output from trend. We use multiple lags of in ation because the quarterly series tends to uctuate substantially. The deviation of output from trend, in contrast, is quite smooth, so the contemporaneous value is an excellent predictor of next period's value. 
B. Results
The coef cient estimates are given in Table 1 . 4 The most important result is that the weight on expected in ation in the policy rule in the 1950's is quite similar to that in the Volcker and Greenspan eras, and noticeably larger than that for the 1960's and 1970's. In both the 1950's and the last two decades of the 20th century the point estimate is greater than 1, indicating that in response to a rise in in ation the Federal Reserve raised the nominal funds rate by enough to also raise the real funds rate. In the late 1960's and 1970's the coef cient is below 1, indicating that the Federal Reserve reduced the real funds rate when in ation rose.
The weight on expected in ation is estimated less precisely in the 1950's than in other decades. However, the point estimate and the narrative evidence presented in Section I tell a very similar story. The Federal Reserve of the 1950's was deeply concerned about in ation and acted aggressively to control it on several occasions. This can be seen in Figure 1 , which shows the 3 Data on the quarterly average of the federal funds rate for 1954:1 to 2000:4 are taken from Citibase. We extend this series back to 1950:1 using data from Edward J. Martens (1958) . (The data in Martens [1958] are reported only in graphical form. After deducing the numbers from the graph, we checked and calibrated our deductions in a period of overlap between the series in Martens and that from Citibase.) We measure in ation as the quarter-toquarter change in the log of the GDP de ator (at an annual rate). The deviation of output from trend is calculated as the difference between the log of real GDP and a log trend. The trend series is estimated using the Hodrick-Prescott lter applied to the period 1952:4-2000:4. 4 We also run the regressions using the three-month Treasury bill rate as the indicator of policy stance and the deviation of quarterly industrial production from trend as the measure of the output gap. Neither of these changes affects the results appreciably. federal funds rate and expected in ation (measured as the tted values of the regression of the lead of in ation on the instruments) during the 1950's. This gure shows that there is a close and strong relationship between the two series for much of the decade. Part of the imprecision of the estimation is the result of the Federal Reserve being particularly concerned about expected in ation in the late 1950's. Figure 1 shows that, while expected in ation derived from the rst-stage regression rose slightly in 1958, its rise was small relative to the tightening by the Federal Reserve. As a result, this looks like a time when the Federal Reserve was not responding to expected in ation. (Furthermore, because expected in ation derived from the rst-stage regression falls in 1959, if one continues the estimation through 1959 the estimated coef cient on in ation falls considerably and is measured even more imprecisely.) However, as described in Section I, the main reason for the tightening by the Federal Reserve at the end of the 1950's was its conviction that in ation was about to rise. In this context, it is useful to note that the Federal Reserve was not alone in fearing in ation at the end of the 1950's. The Livingston survey of expectations for the CPI six months ahead rose steadily from mid-1958 through the end of 1959.
5 Thus, the Federal Reserve was acting out of concern about in ation, even if that concern is not captured by our regression estimates. The coef cient estimates reported in Table 1 show that the weight put on the expected output gap in the 1950's was small. The coefcient is essentially zero and very imprecisely estimated. Figure 2 graphs the expected output gap (measured as the tted values from the regression of the output gap at t 1 1 on the instruments) and the federal funds rate in the 1950's. The obvious positive correlation between the two series does not show up in the multiple regression because of correlation between expected in ation and the output gap.
III. Conclusion
Like central bankers of the 1990's, monetary policymakers of the 1950's had a deep-seated dislike of in ation and acted to control it. Their dislike of in ation was rooted in a model of the economy that emphasized the costs of in ation and the absence of a positive long-run trade-off between output and in ation.
These ndings provide important insights into the performance of the economy in the 1950's. One key reason that in ation was low and steady was almost surely that the Federal Reserve was working to achieve those goals. And one likely reason that recessions were brief and mild is that in ation never got seriously out of hand. As a result, the Federal Reserve never had to undertake a disin ation of the magnitude of those of the 1970's and 1980's. Thomas Mayer (1998) and Taylor (1999) suggest that a naive Keynesian model with an exploitable trade-off between output and in ation and, later, a natural-rate hypothesis with an unrealistically low estimate of the natural rate were the key sources of the in ation of the 1960's and the 1970's. Our nding that these models are so different from that in the low-in ation 1950's and post-Volcker 1980's and 1990's adds credence to this view.
